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This review will consider recent United Nations activity on article 19 of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) concerning the right to live 
independently and be included in the community. The Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities adopted its ‘General Comment’ No. 5 in August 2017, which 
offers guidance to governments on art 19 implementation. This review critically 
examines content relevant to mental health and capacity law, policy and practice. It 
considers the strengths and potential limitations of the General Comment with 
reference to key issues in the field. Gaps include commentary on the rising 
marketisation of disability services globally and a focus on low and middle-income 
countries. Yet overall, the General Comment offers useful guidance on implementing 
this unusual right, including concepts that may help resolve controversies about the 
role of coercion in mental health and capacity law. 
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The institutionalisation and exclusion of persons with disabilities has caused – and 
continues to cause – immense harm to individuals, families and communities. 
Resistance to this harm in international human rights law led to the development of a 
‘right of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with choices equal to 
others’ in art 19 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’).1  
 
The unusual provision is highly relevant to mental health and capacity law.2 On one 
hand, mental health and capacity laws can serve to deprive people of liberty in hospitals 
and other places, including locked wards, hospitals and residential facilities.3 On the 
∗ Piers Gooding, Research Fellow, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne. 
1 United Nations [UN] 2515 UNTS 3, UN Doc A/Res/61/106, Annex, GAOR 61st Session Supp 49, 65. 
(Adopted) 13 Dec 2006, (Opened for Signature) 30 May 2007, (Entered Into Force) 3 May 2008. 
2 I am using ‘mental health and capacity law’ in this paper to refer to mental health legislation and other 
laws related to mental capacity and legal capacity, including those that authorise substituted and/or 
supported decision-making, E.g. – The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England and Wales) c 9; Assisted 
Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (Ireland) No 64 of 2015; Representation Agreement Act 1996 
(Revised Statutes of British Columbia R.S.B.C.) c 405. 
3 Agnes Turnpenny and colleagues, for example, note in their survey of mental health policy in 35 
European countries, how mental health law can serve as a ‘pathway into residential institutions’. A 
Turnpenny, G Petri, A Finn, J Beadle-Brown and M Nyman, Mapping and Understanding Exclusion: 
Institutional, coercive and community-based services and practices across Europe (Mental Health Europe, 
2018) [24] <https://doi.org/10.22024/UniKent/01.02/64970> (accessed 12/02/2018). 
32
other hand, ‘rights-based mental health legislation’ 4  and late 20th Century 
guardianship/mental capacity laws in middle and high-income countries were partly 
introduced to help move people away from large, standalone institutions and to 
promote ‘community care’. While the success of ‘deinstitutionalisation’ may be disputed, 
it is true that liberal law reformers sought to limit interventions to the ‘least restrictive 
means available’ and facilitate access to non-institutional, community-based services.5 
A third dimension in the relevance of independent living is that the absence of 
community-based support for independent living can contribute to the types of crises 
that ‘warrant’ intervention under the terms of mental health and capacity laws. Civil 
commitment laws may be invoked after a person’s mental health crisis is exacerbated 
by unstable housing or institutional-like community services. Mental capacity and 
guardianship law may be invoked when a person with cognitive disability faces a major 
life decision and is in a situation of extreme risk because of their sheer social isolation.  
 
Mental health and capacity law has provoked considerable controversy since the CRPD 
came into effect, yet Art 19 seems to draw an unusual consensus. Commentators across 
the spectrum – from those who see a role for coercion and substituted decision-making, 
to those who think they should be eliminated – appear to agree on the need for more 
resources for people with intellectual, cognitive and psychosocial disabilities so as to 
enable them to exercise their right to live independently and participate in the 
community. As such, the 2017 release by the ‘Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (hereafter ‘the Committee’) of its General Comment no. 5 on art 19, will be 
welcomed by many.6   
 
The Committee is established by Article 34 of the CRPD and is comprised of a panel of 
experts that monitors implementation, including by reviewing the compliance of 
governments that have signed and ratified the CRPD. A ‘General Comment’ is a quasi-
legal document published by United Nations committees, which provides a detailed 
interpretation of an article or issue relating to their respective human rights treaties. 
Helen Keller and Leena Grover have described General Comments as ‘non-binding 
norms that interpret and add detail to the rights and obligations contained in the 
respective human rights treaties’.7 
4 B McSherry and P Weller (eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Hart 2010). 
5 According to Larry Gostin, statutory duties introduced under rights-based mental health law included 
those designed to secure individual rights, including rights to access services and refuse medical 
treatment. L Gostin, ‘The Ideology of Entitlement: The Application of Contemporary Legal Approaches 
to Psychiatry’ in P Bean (ed), Mental Illness: Changes and Trends (Wiley, 1983) [50]. 
6 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 5: Article 19 (2017) on living 
independently and being included in the community, 18th sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/5 (27 October 2017). 
The Committee is authorised under article 34 of the CRPD to monitor implementation of the CRPD; 
including reviewing the compliance reports of ‘States Parties’ (states that have ratified, or have otherwise 
become party to the CRPD) and offering interpretive guidance on key elements of the CRPD. CRPD Art 
34. ‘General Comments’ allow the relevant UN treaty body, in this case the CRPD Committee, to publicly 
interpret provisions from their respective human rights treaty. For more information on the legal status 
of General Comments, see –– Michalowski, S, and W Martin, ‘MoJ/EAP UNCRPD Project Research Note: 
The Legal Status of General Comments’ (The Essex Autonomy Project, 23 May 2014) 
<www.autonomy.essex.ac.uk> (accessed 12/02/2018). 
7 H Keller and L Grover, ‘General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their Legitimacy’ in H 
Keller and G Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) [116], [129]. 
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In this paper I will distil content relevant to mental health and capacity law from the 
CRPD Committees General Comment no. 5 (hereafter ‘the General Comment’). 
Throughout, I will reflect on, among other issues, the inter-related matters of housing 
and economic policy, hospital practices, the privatisation and personalisation of welfare 
services, the issues facing low- and middle-income countries (including countries 




The full text of Art 19 is as follows: 
Living independently and being included in the community––  
States Parties to this Convention recognize the equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in 
the community, with choices equal to others, and shall take effective and appropriate measures 
to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion and 
participation in the community, including by ensuring that: 
(a) Persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose their place of residence and where 
and with whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live in a particular 
living arrangement; 
(b) Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home, residential and other community 
support services, including personal assistance necessary to support living and inclusion in the 
community, and to prevent isolation or segregation from the community; 
(c) Community services and facilities for the general population are available on an equal basis 
to persons with disabilities and are responsive to their needs.   
There is a small but significant body of literature on article 19.8 This material builds on 
a vast literature on disability and ‘independent living’, which variously refers to: a 
philosophy of equal opportunities, self-determination and respect, 9  a global social 
movement10 and a framework for developing law, policy and practice.11  
 
Art 19 exemplifies efforts to blend so-called first-and second-generation rights. In other 
words, the civil and political rights of the provision (particularly, the right to liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose one’s residence) requires the provision of economic, 
cultural and social rights (for example, the right to an adequate standard of living, 
including adequate clothing, food and housing). Additional resources are needed to 
8 E.g. – G Quinn and S Doyle, ‘Taking the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities Seriously: The Past and Future of the EU Structural Funds as a Tool to Achieve Community 
Living’ (2012) 9 The Equal Rights Review [69]; Fundamental Rights Association, Human Rights 
Indicators on Article 19 of the CRPD (2014); Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, “The 
Right of People with Disabilities to Live Independently and Be Included in the Community”, Comm 
DH/Issue Paper (2012) [3], Strasbourg, 13 March 2012. 
9 C Barnes, ‘Independent Living, Politics and Policy in the United Kingdom: A Social Model Account’ (2014) 
1(4) Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal. 
10 E.g. – P Deegan, ‘The Independent Living Movement and People with Psychiatric Disabilities: Taking 
Back Control over Our Own Lives’ (1992) 15 Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal [3]. 
11 G DeJong, ‘Independent Living: From Social Movement to Analytic Paradigm’ (1979) 60(10) Archives of 
physical medicine and rehabilitation [435]; Barnes, above n 9. 
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make civil and political rights real to many disabled people, whereas many non-disabled 
people take such rights for granted.  
 
The European Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, argued that the 
indivisibility of rights in Art 19 is the key to addressing the devastation caused by 
institutionalisation and exclusion: 
[t]he core of the right, which is not covered by the sum of the other rights, is about neutralising 
the devastating isolation and loss of control over one’s life, wrought on people with disabilities 
because of their need for support against the background of an inaccessible society. ‘Neutralising’ 
is understood as both removing the barriers to community access in housing and other domains, 
and providing access to individualised disability-related supports on which enjoyment of this right 
depends for many individuals.12 
The Commissioner suggests that new regulatory measures and funding priorities are 
needed to meet this objective. To this end, the European Fundamental Rights 
Association developed policy indicators to assess Art 19 compliance.13 The indicators 
were drawn upon by the European Parliament, in order to withdraw ‘European 
Structural and Investment Funds’ from the funding of disability institutions.14  
 
However, closing institutions is but one requirement of Art 19. Hammarberg highlighted 
‘worrying trends’ of standalone institutions being replaced by group-based homes and 
residential facilities; ‘targeted exclusively to persons with disabilities’.15 These facilities, 
he writes: ‘compromise the individual’s ability to choose or to interact with and be 
included in the community’.16 Gerard Quinn and Suzanne Doyle elaborate on the Art 19 
obligations that spread beyond institutional closures and extend to establishing ‘a web 
of personalised supports to meet the personal circumstances of the person’.17  
This is not so much about needs and services – it is more about the silent revolution in traditional 
understandings of welfare which is to get away from gross proxies of need (with equally gross 
services) and to focus instead on the life plans and ambitions of the person.18 
From this view, Art 19 operates to both prohibit institutional models of supported 
accommodation and paternalistic domination, while also requiring national investment 
in community-based living options. 
 
Statute and case law have been influenced by Art 19 in some jurisdictions. For example, 
courts have referred to Art 19 in several decisions in the United Kingdom;19 New 
12 T Hammarberg, ‘The Right of People with Disabilities to Live Independently and be Included in the 
Community’ (Issue Paper, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, June 2012) [8].  
13 Fundamental Rights Association, Human Rights Indicators on Article 19 of the CRPD (2014). 
14 Community Living for Europe, Structural Funds Watch, Building on the Promise of European Structural 
and Investment Funds into the Future, Report on roundtable discussions in the European Parliament - 
1st December 2016 (2016) <www.communitylivingforeurope.org/2016/12/15/report-on-roundtable-
discussions-in-the-european-parliament-on-1st-december-2016-outcomes-and-video-recording/> 
(accessed 20/5/2017). 
15 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 8, [9]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Quinn and Doyle, above n 8, [73]. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Burnip v Birmingham City Council & Anor [2012] EWCA Civ 629. 
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Zealand;20 and Australia 21 – generally to limit interference by health and social services 
on the living arrangements of disabled people. Some legislation may even incorporate 
features of Art 19.22 The Department of Health in England, for example, reported that 
the ‘wellbeing principle’ of the Care Act 2014, which guides service delivery by local 
authorities; ‘is intended to cover the key components of independent living as 
expressed in the [CRPD and] in particular, Article 19’.23 It is not clear whether The Care 
Act 2014  actually incorporates Art 19 in practice,24 and the CRPD Committee has 
expressed concern that the United Kingdom has reduced social protection schemes for 
housing; household income and budgets for independent living, including the 
‘Independent Living Fund’. 25  Nevertheless, these examples, including European 
parliamentary steps to divest from institutions, suggest Art 19 is having some impact 
on law, policy and practice internationally.  
 
Art 19 raises several questions for governments. To what extent must states respect a 
person’s right to choose where to live, even in the face of grave risks? What level of 
supports and adjustments need to be guaranteed to meet positive obligations and avoid 
a charge of neglect and abuse? At what point, if at all, can intervention take place that 
might violate the right to independent living – for example, in short-term 
accommodation or hospitalisation? Is Art 19 violated by small group homes and 
clustered living arrangements, which appear to be fixtures of many disability housing 
policies affecting persons who fall under mental health and capacity laws? What are 
good practices for upholding Art 19 for people with mental health, cognitive and 
intellectual disabilities?  
 
Just prior to the release of the General Comment, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (hereafter ‘OHCHR’) published a background paper.26 
The publication includes contributions from Member States, regional organisations, 
disabled peoples’ organisations, broader civil society organisations, the Special 
Rapporteur on Disability, national human rights institutions and others.27 A day of 
general discussion in April 2017 also preceded the General Comment, for which written 
submissions are publicly available. 28  Taken together, these materials form a rich 
20 Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184; [2012] 3 NZLR 456 (14 May 2012) [42]; Bracking v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345. 
21 P J B v Melbourne Health & Anor (Patrick's case) [2011] VSC 327 (19 July 2011) [210]. 
22 Department of Health (United Kingdom), Guidance: Care and support statutory guidance (Updated 24 
February 2017)<www.gov.uk/government/publications/care-act-statutory-guidance/care-and-support-
statutory-guidance>(accessed 5/05/2017); Care Act (England) 2014  Ch 23 Pt 1 s 1; see also –– Social 
Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 anaw 4. 
23 Department of Health (United Kingdom), above n 22, (para) 1.19; Care Act 2014  Ch 23 Pt 1 s 1. 
24 L Series, ‘The elusive Article 19’ on L Series, The Small Places (24 Nov 2016)  
   <https://thesmallplaces.wordpress.com> (accessed 12/02/18).  
25 CRPD/C/GBR/CO/1, (para) 44(b). 
26 Thematic study on the right of persons with disabilities to live independently and be included in the 
community Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 28th sess, 
UN Doc, A/HRC/28/37, 12 December 2014. 
27 For the full text of submissions, see:  
  <www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disability/Pages/LiveIndependently.aspx>  
  (accessed 5/05/2017). 
28 See: <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CallDGDtoliveindependently.aspx>  
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resource in global efforts to reduce exclusion, and promote independent living and 
inclusive communities. 
 
III. A SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL COMMENT 
 
The General Comment is grouped into four major sections, related to: (1) the normative 
content of Art 19, (2) the obligations of States Parties, (3) the relationship of Art 19 to 
other parts of the CRPD, and (4) national implementation. I will summarise these 
sections here, though readers familiar with the General Comment may wish to jump 
straight to Part IV.  
 
(a) Normative Content  
 
The General Comment immediately positions Art 19 as a response to the historical 
denial of the individual choice and control of disabled person across all areas of their 
lives.29 As the Committee notes: 
[i]ndependent living and inclusive life in the community are ideas that historically stemmed from 
persons with disabilities asserting control over the way they want to live by creating empowering 
forms of support’.30  
For most people with disability: ‘[s]upport is either unavailable or tied to particular living 
arrangements’31, and the result for many has been ‘abandonment, dependence on 
family, institutionalization, isolation and segregation’. 32The Committee characterise 
most law, policy and practice as tending to portray individuals with the disability as the 
problem. Traditionally, efforts have been directed to altering the behaviour of the 
individual and forcing her or him to fit into social structures that are unaccommodating 
and even hostile to people with disability. Hence, the Committee emphasise two 
dimensions of Art 19: the personal (particularly, creating a sphere of protection around 
the person’s home, lifestyle choices, and so on) and the social (particularly, improving 
the accessibility and inclusivity of communities).  
 
The Committee highlight that Art 19: 
[i]s an example of the interrelation, interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights’, 
describing it as ‘one of the widest ranging and most intersectional articles of the Convention 
[which] has to be considered as integral to [its] full implementation.33 
The Committee also restates from the CRPD Preamble that most persons with 
disabilities live in poverty, emphasising the material conditions in which independent 
living can occur. At the same time, the Committee highlight that the ‘cost of social 
exclusion is high as it perpetuates dependency.’34  
   (accessed 5/05/2017). 
29 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [4]. 
30 Ibid [4]. 
31 Ibid [1]. 
32 Ibid [1]. 
33 Ibid [6]. 




[p]olicies and concrete plans of action for social inclusion of persons with disabilities… represent 
a cost-effective mechanism to ensure the enjoyment of rights, sustainable development and a 
reduction in poverty.35 
The Committee links Art 19 to previous human rights treaties. 36  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter “UDHR”), for example, recognises the 
interdependence of an individual’s personal development and his or her social and 
community life. Art 29(1) of the UDHR states:  
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible.37  
For those who have seen—or themselves experienced—the way peoples identities are 
spoiled in institutional environments, the relevance of free and full development of 
personality will be immediately obvious. The restatement in Art 19 of the right to choose 
one’s place of residence also stands as an integral part of several human rights 
instruments.38  
 
(b) The Obligations of State Parties 
 
The Committee discuss the obligations on States Parties to ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’. 
The first of these obligations, the obligation to respect refers to governments refraining 
from interference in a person’s autonomy and his or her choices about where and with 
whom to live.39 This obligation includes: 
Releas[ing] all individuals who are confined against their will in mental health services or other 
disability-specific forms of deprivation of liberty. It further includes the prohibition of all forms of 
guardianship and the obligation to replace substituted decision-making regimes with supported 
decision-making alternatives.40 
The second obligation, to protect, relates to states preventing ‘third parties from 
directly or indirectly interfering with the enjoyment of the right to live independently 
within the community’, which includes ‘family members and third parties, service 
providers, landowners or providers of general services’.41 Positive obligations include 
improving ‘accessibility for persons with disabilities within the community and [raising] 
35 Ibid. 
36 The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women UN Doc A/RES/34/180, Annex 
(CEDAW) is discussed, as is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations [UN]) 1577 UNTS 
3, CTS 1992/3, UN Doc A/RES/44/25, UN Reg No I-27531 (CRC). See –– CRPD Committee, above n 6, 
[10-11]. 
37 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations [UN]) UN Doc A/810, 71, UN Doc A/RES/217(III) 
A, GAOR 3rd Session Part I, 71 (Singed) 10 Dec 1948,[art 29 (1)].  
38 E.g. – UDHR, article 13; ICCPR, articles 12, 25. 
39 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [47-49]. 
40 Ibid [48]. 
41 Ibid [50]. 
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awareness among all persons in society about inclusion of persons with disabilities 
within the community’.42  
 
The third obligation, to fulfil, refers to the creation of ‘appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures’ to meet Art 19 
requirements, including: ’deinstitutionalising’, consulting with disabled peoples 
organisations in crafting alternatives, ensuring affordable housing, moving away from 
deficit-focused assessments of impairment as a pre-requisite for services and instead 
looking to a person’s support needs, and personalising services accordingly.43 The 
Committee also promotes access to justice, including through ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ (article 2)44 and ‘procedural accommodation’ (article 13)45 so that 
persons with disabilities can assert their right to independent and community living and 
have it enforced.46  
 
(c) Relationship to other Articles  
 
The General Comment contains a reasonably comprehensive section on the relationship 
between article 19 and other parts of the CRPD. Particular attention is paid to Art 4(3) 
(in which consultation with disabled people is required),47 Art 5 (equality and non-
discrimination),48 Art 6 (intersectional barriers facing women and girls),49 and so on.50 
I will discuss in the next Section the Committees view on interactions between Art 19 
and key operative articles affecting mental health and capacity law, particularly articles: 
12 (equal recognition before the law); 14 (liberty and security of the person), 16 
(freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse), 23 (the right to family for children 
and parents with disabilities), and 25 (health care).51 The connections between Art 19 
and other parts of the CRPD helps to connect the concept of independent living across 
different points of a person’s typical life-course; as a child, a student, a worker, a voter, 
a family member, senior citizen, and so on.52  
42 Ibid [57]. See also –– Concluding Observations by the CRPD Committee on Kenya (CRPD/C/KEN/CO/1 
[23]), Uganda (CRPD/C/UGA/CO/1 [22]). 
43 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [54-65]. 
44 ‘Reasonable accommodation’ is defined in the CRPD as ‘necessary and appropriate modification and 
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to 
ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’. CRPD, Article 2. 
45 ‘Procedural accommodation’ is defined in the CRPD as measures that facilitate a person’s ‘effective role 
as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at 
investigative and other preliminary stages’. CRPD Article 13. 
46 Ibid [66] and [81]. 
47 Ibid [70]. 
48 Ibid [71]. 
49 Ibid [72]. 
50 Ibid [73-77]. 
51 Ibid [78-91]. 
52 On this point, the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (now ‘Validity’) submission is informative. Mental 
Disability Advocacy Centre, ‘The Right to Live Independently and be Included in the Community - Written 
Comments to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in response to its Call for 




(d) Implementation at the National Level 
 
The Committee identify key elements needed for States Parties to realise a 
‘standardized minimum support level sufficient to allow the exercise of the right to live 
independently and be included in the community’.53 These elements include: ensuring 
the right to legal capacity; ensuring non-discrimination in accessing housing (‘including 
the elements of both income and accessibility’); developing action plans for 
independent living for persons with disabilities within the community; monitoring and 
sanctioning non-compliance with legislation; developing plans and guidance on 
accessibility requirements for basic mainstream services; taking steps towards 
developing and implementing ‘basic, personalized, non-shared and rights-based 
disability-specific support services’; and collecting ‘consistent quantitative and 
qualitative data on persons with disabilities, including those still living in institutions’.54 
Failure to ensure any of these elements to persons with disabilities counts as a failure 
to fulfill States Parties’ Art 19 obligations, according to the Committee.55  
 
The Committee distinguishes between parts of Art 19 subject to ‘immediate and 
progressive realisation’. The Committee note that: ‘[a]s a civil right, article 19(a), the 
right to choose one’s residence and where, how and with whom to live, is immediately 
applicable’.56 In contrast, both 19(b) and (c) are ‘subject to progressive realization’,57 
given that Art 19(b) ‘is a classic social right’, and Art 19(c) ‘is a social and a cultural 
right, given that many community services, such as cinemas, public parks, theatres and 
sports facilities, serve cultural purposes’. Nevertheless, States Parties must:  
[t]ake steps to the maximum of their available resources .. taken immediately or within a 
reasonably short period of time .. (and in a way that is) .. deliberate, concrete, targeted and .. 
(pursued by) .. all appropriate means.58   
The Committee acknowledge ‘advancements in implementing article 19 in the past 
decade’ yet frame the Comment by listing major barriers to this implementation. These 
barriers are worth citing in full:  
(a) Denial of legal capacity, either through formal laws and practices or de facto by substitute 
decision-making about living arrangements; 
(b) Inadequacy of social support and protection schemes for ensuring living independently   
within the community; 
(c) Inadequacy of legal frameworks and budget allocations aimed at providing personal 
assistance and individualized support; 
(d) Physical and regulatory institutionalization, including of children and forced treatment in all 
its forms; 
(e) Lack of deinstitutionalization strategies and plans and continued investments in institutional 
care settings; 
53 CRPD Committee, above n 6 [38].  
54 Ibid [38][a-h]. 
55 Ibid [43], See –– International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations [UN]) 999 UNTS 
171, UN Doc A/6316, UN Doc A/RES/2200(XXI), Annex, UN Reg No I-14668 [Signed] 19 Dec 1966 
[Entered into Force] 23 Mar 1976, [Article 2]. 
56 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [39]. 
57 Ibid. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [Article 2(1)]. 
58 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [41]. 
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(f) Negative attitudes, stigma and stereotypes preventing persons with disabilities from being 
included in the community and accessing available assistance; 
(g) Misconceptions about the right to living independently within the community; 
(h) Lack of available, acceptable, affordable, accessible and adaptable services and facilities, such 
as transport, health care, schools, public spaces, housing, theatres, cinemas, goods and 
services and public buildings;  
(i) Lack of adequate monitoring mechanisms for ensuring the appropriate implementation of 
article 19, including the participation of representative organizations of persons with 
disabilities; 
(j) Insufficient mainstreaming of disability in general budget allocations;  
(k) Inappropriate decentralization, resulting in disparities between local authorities and unequal 
chances of living independently within the community in a State party.59 
Each of these barriers can be seen to operate in the mental health and capacity law 
context in some way. Many of these barriers more closely concern policy, including 
budgets; awareness-raising, and closing institutions and institutional environments. 
Explicit legal matters are raised at paragraph 15 subsections (a) and (d), regarding 




Several features of the General Comment stand out as being immediately relevant to 
this review.   
 
(a) Definitions  
 
The Committee usefully define terms such as ‘independent living’, ‘community living’, 
and ‘personal assistance’.60 Independent living is premised upon interdependence as 
the natural state of human being: 
Independent living/living independently means that individuals with disabilities are provided with 
all necessary means to enable them to exercise choice and control over their lives and make all 
decisions concerning their lives… Independent living is an essential part of the individual’s 
autonomy and freedom and does not necessarily mean living alone. It should also not be 
interpreted solely as the ability to carry out daily activities by oneself. Rather, it should be 
regarded as the freedom to choose and control, in line with the respect for inherent dignity and 
individual autonomy as enshrined in article 3 (a) of the Convention.61  
The Committee was almost certainly influenced in its understanding of interdependence 
by Jenny Morris and the conceptual inroads of other ethics of care scholars.62 The 2017 
report of Catalina Devandas, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, on rights-based support also elaborates on interdependence, 
offering a useful supplement to the General Comment (and an informative report in its 
own right).63  
  59 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [15]. 
60 Ibid [16](a-d). 
61 Ibid [16](a). 
62 E.g. – J Morris, ‘Impairment and disability: constructing an ethics of care that promotes human rights’, 
(2001) 16(1) Hypatia [1]. 
63 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities’ UN 
Doc, 34th sess, A/HRC/34/58 (20 December 2016). 
41
 
The Committee define the inverse concept of ‘institutionalisation’ quite broadly:  
[i]t is not “just” about living in a particular building or setting; it is, first and foremost, about not 
losing personal choice and autonomy as a result of the imposition of certain life and living 
arrangements… [N]either large scale institutions with more than a hundred residents nor smaller 
group homes with five to eight individuals, nor even individual homes can be called independent 
living arrangements if they have other defining elements of institutions or institutionalization.64 
Defining elements of institutionalisation include:  
[o]bligatory sharing of assistants with others and no or limited influence over whom one has to 
accept assistance from; isolation and segregation from independent life within the community; 
lack of control over day-to-day decisions; lack of choice over whom to live with; rigidity of routine 
irrespective of personal will and preferences; identical activities in the same place for a group of 
persons under a certain authority; a paternalistic approach in service provision; supervision of 
living arrangements; and usually also a disproportion in the number of persons with disabilities 
living in the same environment. Institutional settings may offer persons with disabilities a certain 
degree of choice and control; however, these choices are limited to specific areas of life and do 
not change the segregating character of institutions.65 
This definition expands on Erving Goffman’s concept of ‘total institution’,66 and is likely 
to challenge all governments, whether concerning large-standalone institutions and 
other largescale sites of congregation, residential facilities, group homes or even family 
homes with a segregating character. 
 
The definitions in the General Comment are surely valuable. Terminology in this area 
is often technical, and sector or discipline-specific. ‘Person-centred’, ‘social inclusion’, 
‘empowerment’ and ‘peer-support’, for example, are commonly used in policy, 
scholarship, advocacy, programming and elsewhere, often without a clear sense of 
what precisely is meant. Tribunals, courts, policymakers, service providers, may not 
acknowledge the intended meaning, cloaking the underlying purposes of their use, 
which remain at best only vaguely stated. Participants in debates risk misunderstanding 
one another. Even the term ‘community’ may be misused or used vaguely in ways that 
describe practices that would fall squarely within the Committees definition of 
‘institutional’.67 
 
64 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [15](c) (emphasis added). 
65 Ibid. 
66 See –– E Goffman, ‘On the characteristics of total institutions’ in Symposium on preventive and social 
psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Medical Centre, 1961, [312]. 
67 This point is made by the WNUSP in its submission: [t]he use of the term community in [Art 19] must 
be distinguished from that which may be artificially created within settings that amount to deprivations 
of liberty. Communities should be identified to be neighbourhoods, integrated schools, free labour 
market workplaces.’ The World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, in its submission to the 
Committee, produced a useful annexure on this point. World Network of Users and Survivors of 
Psychiatry (WNUSP) ‘Submission of the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP) 
for the Day of General Discussion (DGD) on the right of persons with disabilities to live independently 
and be included in the community, to be held on 19 April 2016 in Geneva’, fn 5 <http://www.ohchr.org> 
(accessed 6 February 2018). 
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Interestingly, the Committee expressed concerns over terminology misuse more 
explicitly in the draft General Comment. ‘Independent and community living’ and 
‘personal assistance’ were described as ‘frequently used by organizations providing 
residential or institutional support services [in ways that] that mislead assumptions by 
the public’.68 The paragraph was removed in the final General Comment, but similar 
sentiments remained elsewhere in the final text.69  
 
(b) Mental Health and other Substituted Decision-Making Legislation   
 
The Committee re-states its explicit rejection of mental health legislation and all forms 
of substituted decision-making.70 States must:  
[r]epeal all laws that prevent any person with disabilities, regardless of the type of impairment, 
to choose where and with whom and how to live, including the right not to be confined on the 
basis of any kind of disability.71 
For the Committee: 
[n]either the full or partial deprivation of any “degree” of legal capacity nor the level of support 
required may be invoked to deny or limit the right to independence and independent living in the 
community to persons with disabilities.72  
The Committee reject ‘forced treatment in all its forms’ as one of the barriers to 
independent living and community participation, 73  making clear that interventions 
under mental health or mental capacity laws cannot be construed as somehow 
‘facilitating’ the right to live independently and be included in the community. This 
position will frustrate those who see involuntary treatment or deputyship /guardianship 
as a ‘tincture of coercion’ that can restore a person’s agency and ability to take part in 
community. An example might be a person in sheer psychosis living on the street who 
refuses all help but after a short period of forced treatment, willingly seeks support and 
moves to ‘safer’ living conditions.74 Another example might be a temporary intervention 
under mental capacity law to remove a person with a cognitive disability who faces 
daily substituted decisions, and even abuse, by an overbearing parent, yet who wishes 
to remain in the house.75 
 
From the Committees view, even if substituted decision-making can serve these 
functions in some circumstances, intervention against the will and preference of a 
68 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [16]. 
69 Ibid [51]. 
70 See –– Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1: Article 12: Equal 
Recognition Before the Law, 11th sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 May 2014); Guidelines on the right  to 
liberty and security of persons with disabilities (A/72/55, annex).  
71 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [97][a]. 
72 Ibid [20]. 
73 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [15](d). 
74 L Rosenbaum, ‘Liberty versus Need — Our Struggle to Care for People with Serious Mental Illness’ (2016) 
375(15) New England Journal of Medicine [1490]. 
75 For an incisive CRPD-oriented examination of precisely this scenario, see –– A Arstein-Kerslake, ‘An 
Empowering Dependency: Exploring Support for the Exercise of Legal Capacity’ (2016) 18(1) 
Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research [77]. 
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person or removal of the person to an institutional environment is an unacceptable 
cost. Instead, pathways to independent living and community participation must be 
created for people in various degrees of crisis and disablement. In addition, states are 
obligated under articles 4(e) and 5.2 to prohibit discrimination by private actors who 
refuse to respect the autonomy and legal capacity of persons with disabilities and must 
find ways to do so that do not intrude on the rights of the victims/survivors. 
 
Locked mental health wards clearly activate Art 19 – even as they may more directly 
concern Art 14 (right to liberty) – and are a logical site for CRPD-based change. Locked 
wards have been criticised by several commentators in recent years,76 including by 
some empirical quantitative researchers. Christian Huber and colleagues, for example, 
published the findings from their 2016 analysis of 349,574 admissions to 21 German 
psychiatric inpatient hospitals, monitored over a 15-year period. They reported that 
suicide, suicide attempts, and absconding with return and without return (all major 
justifications for locking wards) were not increased in hospitals with an ‘open door 
policy’; in contrast, treatment on open wards was associated with a decreased 
probability of suicide attempts, absconding with return, and absconding without return, 
but not completed suicide (to which the difference was considered insignificant).77 
Drawing on the same dataset, the researchers later reported that rates of aggression 
by service users and others subject to mental health law were lower in wards with an 
open door policy. 78  Huber and colleagues concluded by recommending; ‘policies 
targeted at empowering treatment approaches, respecting the patient's autonomy and 
promoting reductions of institutional coercion’. 79  Their research was not without 
critics,80 but the findings offer some empirical and pragmatic support for rights-based 
claims against locked wards.  
 
In addition to requiring compliance in mental healthcare settings, Art 19 also seems to 
require non-hospital alternatives for people who may need support, including support 
for people in acute crises who may wish to stay in their home. The rather arbitrary 
dichotomy between ‘hospital’ and ‘community’, which took hold in policy discourse in 
the post-asylum era (at least in high-income countries), surely reflects a lack of political 
imagination in conceiving a wide range of supports required for people with 
psychosocial disability across the population. According to the WNUSP, the broader 
policy framework required should include reasonable accommodation for people with 
disabilities to use mainstream community services like legal services, hospitals, shelters 
(and not just disability-specific services), as well as home-based supports for people in 
76 See –– B McSherry, ‘Locked Mental Health Wards: The Answer to Absconding?’ (2014) 22(1) Journal of 
Law and Medicine [17].  
77 CG Huber, et al. ‘Suicide Risk and Absconding in Psychiatric Hospitals with and without Open Door 
Policies: A 15 Year, Observational Study’ (2016) 3(9) The Lancet Psychiatry [842]. 
78 AR Schneeberger, et al. ‘Aggression and Violence in Psychiatric Hospitals with and without Open Door 
Policies: A 15-Year Naturalistic Observational Study’ (2017) 95 Journal of Psychiatric Research [189]. 
79 Ibid. 
80 T Pollmächer and T Steinert, ‘Arbitrary Classification of Hospital Policy Regarding Open and Locked 
Doors.” (2016) 3(12) The Lancet Psychiatry 1103. There is also some evidence produced by Nijman and 
colleagues that door locking is associated with reduced absconding. H Nijman et al. ‘Door locking and 
exit security measures on acute psychiatric admission wards’ (2011) 18 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental 
Health Nursing [614]. 
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crisis, recognition of support systems for decision making, the linking of hospitals and 
registered disabled people’s organisations, and prohibiting any sort of linkage between 
eligibility for accessing services and a person’s decision to discontinue or modify 
treatment directives. 81  Arguably this challenge to the hospital/community binary, 
particularly in the mental health context, calls for a re-casting of current responses to 
acute crisis resolution, including the provision of respite services, peer-run respite 
houses, intensive home-based support, and so on. 
 
The Committee draw out links between Art 12 and 19, which may help uncover common 
ground among those disputing the value of forced interventions and substituted 
decision-making: 
To fully realize the transition to supported decision-making and implement the rights enshrined 
in article 12, it is imperative that persons with disabilities have the opportunity to develop and 
express their wishes and preferences in order to exercise their legal capacity on an equal basis 
with others. To achieve this, they have to be a part of the community. Furthermore, support in 
the exercise of legal capacity should be provided using a community-based approach which 
respects the wishes and preferences of individuals with disabilities.82 
In other words, independent living and participation in the community can offer 
‘building blocks’ for a person to exercise his or her standing as a person before the 
law.83 Having a safe home, a valued social role, and a variety of relationships can help 
create opportunities to exercise one’s autonomy. As an example, consider a person who 
does not even consider the abuse and violence she experienced in an institution or a 
group home to constitute a crime. In addition, she may have felt so devalued that she 
did not raise concerns with authorities for fear of being dismissed. After being 
supported to move into a home of her own, and establishing friends, neighbours and 
colleagues, she may come to understand her experience as assault and pursue legal 
redress.84  
 
Housing is another area in which ‘building blocks’ can be laid for achieving equal 
recognition before the law (bringing together articles 12, 19, 23 and 28). Housing in 
the mental health context could include housing that is both aligned and non-aligned 
to mental health services. Some may refuse any housing attached to mental health 
services, others may embrace it. ‘Housing First’ policies and programs are an example 
of how such support can be provided. Under some iterations of the scheme, people 
with actual or perceived psychosocial disability who are homeless are supported 
through intensive case management to move into regular housing, with no requirement 
that they adhere to treatment plans (even as it is offered).85  
81 WNUSP, above n 67, [12]. 
82 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [26]. 
83 G Quinn, ‘Rethinking Personhood: New Directions in Legal Capacity Law and Policy’ (Paper, New 
Foundations for Personhood and Legal Capacity in the 21st Century Conference, University of British 
Columbia, 29 April 2011) 17 <www.nuigalway.ie>. 
84 For an example of this dynamic for a person with intellectual disability, see e.g. – Jane Rosengrave, ‘You 
Only Live Once’, in 19 Stories of Social Inclusion (website), Belonging Matters & University of Melbourne 
<https://www.19stories.org/copy-of-story-14-2> (accessed 09/03/2018). 
85 E.g. – Micah Projects, Housing First: a foundation for recovery Breaking the cycle of Brisbane’s housing, 
homelessness and mental health challenges (2016) <www.micahprojects.org.au>  (accessed 3/4/2018). 
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The often-cited ‘personligt ombud’ (PO) scheme in Sweden (PO Skåne) is another 
example. Under the scheme, a legal mentor or personal ombudsperson is appointed to 
assist a person to make legal decisions.86 Consider the following case described by the 
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare: 
After a stay in hospital, a client wanted to live in a flat of his own. Since this was the client’s wish, 
he was supported by the personal ombudsperson while many other professional involved with 
the client advised against it, saying that it would not work out. This in fact turned out to be the 
case: the client eventually moved into housing with special support and was very happy there. 
Professionals in the social services and psychiatric services thought that this was an unnecessary 
failure, while the PO’s view was that the reason why the client was so happy in the special housing 
was that he had been given the chance to live in his own flat.87 
The emphasis of the personal ombudsperson on respecting the will and preference of 
the client in this case, rather than prioritising risk-aversion and expert-based 
paternalism, demonstrates how articles 12 and 19 (and other articles, such as 28 on 
adequate standard of living and social protection) can work in practice. The example 
also highlights the importance of having a floor of social protection that allows for 
multiple choices from among ‘good’ options about how to live.  
 
One challenging issue for governments and civil society is the type of mistakes and 
consequences which must be tolerated under a CRPD-based framework, for example; 
where a person takes a risk and ends up coming to great harm, including suicide or 
violence against others. In deliberating on any such concerns in domestic law and policy 
reform, it should be immediately acknowledged that current schemes entail 
consequences that are effectively seen as an acceptable cost—even if such costs are 
seen as regrettable with steps taken to try to ameliorate them (for example, traumatic 
experiences and side-effects from forced psychiatric interventions, increasing rates of 
hospital-based detention in some countries,88 high rates of sexual harassment and 
assault of women involuntarily placed in psychiatric wards, and so on). 
 
Just as improving social conditions can improve one’s chances of exercising legal 
capacity, the converse is also true. Restoring formal legal capacity under domestic laws 
can clearly improve one’s chances for independent living and participation in the 
community. The 2011 case of P J B v Melbourne Health & Anor (known as “Patrick’s 
Case”) in Victoria, Australia, is illustrative. “Patrick” was a 58 year-old man with 
psychosocial disability who appealed an order by the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal appointing a financial administrator under the Guardianship and Administration 
Act 1986 (Vic) (Austl). The appointed administrator made clear his intention to sell 
86 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Chapter Six: From provisions to practice: 
implementing the Convention, Legal Capacity and Supported Decision-Making’, United Nations 
Handbook for Parliamentarians on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Geneva, 
2007) [89] <www.un.org>. 
87 Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, ‘A New Profession is Born – Personligt ombud, PO’ (Västra 
Aros, Västerås, November 2008) [10] <www.personligtombud.se>. 
88 Community and Mental Health Team, NHS Digital, Inpatients formally detained in hospitals under the 
Mental Health Act 1983, and patients subject to supervised community treatment Uses of the Mental 
Health Act: Annual Statistics, 2015/16 (30 November 2016) <www.content.digital.nhs.uk>. 
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Patrick’s home against Patrick’s wishes. Patrick was detained under the Mental Health 
Act 1986 (Vic) (Austl) at the time. His treating psychiatrist had sought the appointment 
to prevent Patrick from repeatedly seeking to leave hospital and return to his own 
home. The presiding judge referred to Patrick ‘using his home as a medical refuge’ in 
the eyes of the psychiatrist.89 The Court held that the order of Tribunal appointing an 
administrator unjustifiably interfered with Patrick’s human rights under the Victorian 
Human Rights Charter and ordered that the appointment of an administrator be set 
aside. The Judge referred explicitly to articles 12, 19 and 23 (the right to respect for 
home and family) of the CRPD in framing the decision.90  
 
There have been some efforts to integrate the push for positive rights with Art 19 into 
mental health law. Argentina’s National Mental Health Law 2010 (‘NMHL’), 91  for 
example, contains a mechanism in which people in apparent mental health crises are 
subject to interdisciplinary evaluations which seek to identify the availability of support 
in a person’s life. Where gaps appear, the evaluations can lead to a court ordering that 
voluntary services are made available to the individual (though the voluntary nature of 
this support is clearly distorted to some degree by the prospect of forced intervention 
by the same evaluation team/court).92 The evaluation team reportedly use the CRPD 
as a guide when communicating and reporting to judges, including highlighting a 
person’s communication needs, seeking to discover the person’s views on past 
experiences of involuntary treatment, and possible gaps in informal or formal services 
that could be remedied with voluntary services marshalled by the court.93  
 
The NMHL clearly does not accord with the CRPD and the high standards of the CRPD 
Committee; it neither questions the legitimacy of forced psychiatric intervention nor 
removes a rebuttable presumption of mental capacity. Yet, the NMHL does show how 
government agencies working under current laws can to some degree promote Art 19 
obligations by placing an order, as it were, on services to assist a person to live 
independently and participate in community. 
 
As noted, one stated purpose of ‘rights-based’ mental health and capacity law was to 
facilitate access to the supports people need in the wake of ‘deinstitutionalisation’.94 
However, this stated goal is generally agreed to be the least successful of the ‘new 
89 E.g. – P J B v Melbourne Health & Anor (Patrick's case) [2011] VSC 327 (19 July 2011). 
90 P J B v Melbourne Health & Anor (Patrick's case) [2011] VSC 327 (19 July 2011) [134-137], [337]. 
91 Law No 26657, 3 December 2010 [32041] BO 1; ‘Mental Health Regime’, House of Representatives Res 
D-276/07 (7 March 2007) Art 1. 
92 Law No 26657, 3 December 2010 [32041] BO 1; ‘Mental Health Regime’, House of Representatives Res 
D-276/07 (7 March 2007) Art 42. 
93 FJ Bariffi and MS Smith, ‘Same Old Game but with Some New Players Assessing Argentina’s National 
Mental Health Law in Light of the Rights to Liberty and Legal Capacity under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities’ (2013) 31(3) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 
325, at [339–40]. 
94 Statutory duties introduced under mental health law include those designed to secure individual rights, 
including rights to accessing services, refusing medical treatment, and having a review process for 
decisions concerning detention and imposed treatment decisions. L Gostin, ‘The Ideology of Entitlement: 
The Application of Contemporary Legal Approaches to Psychiatry’ in P Bean (ed), Mental Illness: Changes 
and Trends (Wiley, 1983) [50]. 
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legalism’ framework. Gerard Quinn has argued that this shortcoming draws mental 
health debates into an imprisoning logic:  
Some civil libertarians would hesitate to use an argument for a legal right to treatment (no matter 
how meritorious) lest the need for treatment might be used to justify an undue encroachment on 
liberty. Contrariwise, some professionals in the field who have the responsibility to deliver 
services, would hesitate to embrace liberty-enhancing arguments lest it interfere too much with 
their capacity to deliver a substantive right to treatment—with their professional prerogatives.95  
A common critique of ‘new legalism’ is its struggle to secure substantive rights to 
persons with mental impairments in the form of facilitating access to voluntary 
healthcare and support.96 The normative content of Art 19 provides an alternative 
framework for garnering appropriate social provisions and altering the powers of 
expertise over subjects of mental health law. 
 
Looking beyond mental health and capacity law, examples from domestic violence, drug 
and alcohol, and homelessness services are worth considering. The previous 
hypothetical about housing support did not include a situation where someone refuses 
housing services and government-run shelters altogether. The Committee is not explicit 
about an appropriate response in such cases. Imaginably, good support would include 
blankets, a tent, food, advocacy, periodic reiteration that housing options are available, 
and other basic guarantees aimed at harm minimisation.  
 
Similarly, in drug and alcohol services, strategies for basic guarantees and harm 
minimisation might include needle exchange and safe injecting houses, and the offer 
for a range of voluntary rehabilitation services — these are all existing practices. In 
domestic violence service and policies, there are well established harm minimisation 
strategies in situations where victims/survivors of abuse prefer to live with perpetrators, 
in which parens patriae or police powers are not marshalled against the victim/survivor. 
Art 19 and the CRPD more broadly, invite a comparison of the liberty rights and social 
protection promoted in these other service contexts compared to the public policy 
imperatives of mental health or mental capacity laws. The equality demands of the 
CRPD counter the view that there is something about mental health conditions that 
warrants special exceptions to normative rights.  
 
(c) Group Homes, Clustered Living and Involuntary Community Intervention 
 
The Committee call for states to ‘ensure that public or private funds are not spent on 
maintaining, renovating, establishing, building existing and new institutions in any form 
of institutionalization’ including ‘private institutions… established in the guise of 
“community living”. 97 This characterisation would include numerous sites affecting 
people subject to mental health and capacity laws. Group homes, aged-care settings, 
95 G Quinn, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with [sic] Disabilities – Towards a 
Unified Field Theory of Disability’ (presentation paper) Indian Law Society, G.V. Pandit Memorial Oration, 
Pune, India, 10 October 2009, 11 <www.nuigalway.ie/cdlp>.  
96 See –– P Weller, ‘Lost in Translation: Human Rights and Mental Health Law’ in B McSherry and P Weller 
(eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Law (Hart, 2010) [51]; J Peay (ed), Seminal Issues in 
Mental Health Law (Ashgate, 2005) [xvii]. 
97 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [51]. 
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long-stay psychiatric wards, secure facilities, community-based clustered homes will fall 
under the expansive definition of ‘institutional’. Certain forms of compulsory 
interventions outside of hospitals (e.g. ‘community treatment orders’ and ‘assertive 
outpatient treatment’) may also offend Art 19. ‘[E]ven individual homes’ are implicated 
where other defining elements of institutionalisation are present, including ‘no or limited 
influence over whom one has to accept assistance from … a paternalistic approach in 
service provision [and] supervision of living arrangements’.  
 
Congregate and cluster housing models are used by numerous governments as a “step-
down” from institutionalisation or as stable feature of so-called deinstitutionalised 
systems. Middle and high-income countries often develop such arrangements as 
cornerstones of ‘deinstitutionalisation’. Many congregate and cluster housing models 
have been criticised in the past for being at odds with the policy aims of ‘community 
care’ and ‘normalisation’. 98 However, the Committee do not rule out group-based 
housing and nor is there anything in Art 19 that prohibits it. Instead, the Committee 
suggests congregation is typically a defining element of institutional environments. 
Indeed, a particularly oppressive family home, in which one person with disability lives 
among many without disability, could contain ‘institutional’ and exclusionary elements 
that offend Art 19. The OHCHRs thematic study here provides tests to identify living 
situations that are not compliant with the CRPD, which include the following: 
Living arrangements should be assessed taking into account issues such as the choice of 
housemates, who decides when residents can enter or exit, who is allowed to enter a person’s 
home, who decides the schedule of daily activities, who decides what food is eaten and what is 
bought and who pays the expenses.99 
It is noteworthy that the term ‘group homes’, which were referred to pejoratively in the 
Draft version of the General Comment, were removed for the final draft. It is possible 
that this amendment occurred in response to the submission of the Centre for Disability 
Studies and Disability Law Hub, University of Leeds, which stated that outright rejection 
of group settings risked: 
(a) overlooking the de facto institutionalization that can take place when a disabled person lives 
alone or isolated in the community and is dependent upon support and services over which they 
have no choice or control; and (b) overlooking the potential of collective living options in which 
disabled people (and others) may choose to live and in which they will have full choice and 
control.100 
WNUSP take up this point and, like the University of Leeds submission, emphasises the 
importance of deliberative design in compliant group settings. WNUSP made a specific 
request for the involvement of ‘our representative organizations [in the] designing of a 
range of residential, in-home and community services to ensure inclusion and full 
participation in the community, and encourage innovation in… research’.101  
 
98 I Wiesel and C Bigby, ‘Movement on Shifting Sands: Deinstitutionalisation and People with Intellectual 
Disability in Australia, 1974–2014’ (2015) 33(2) Urban Policy and Research, [178]. 
99 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 26, [20-22]. 
100 Centre for Disability Studies and Disability Law Hub, University of Leeds, ‘Response to Draft General 
Comment on Article 19’, [1] <http://www.ohchr.org> (accessed 6 February 2018). 




The Committee point to recent global financial crises and warn against the 
disproportionate impact of fiscal downturns on people with disabilities. So-called 
austerity measures – whether real or contrived – would require specific safeguards, 
according to the Committee, to prevent disproportionate effect on persons with 
disabilities.102 This directive is timely. Case law is emerging in which austerity measures 
appear to influence the imposed limits on the provision of state resources for 
independent living.103  
 
Cost will inevitably pose a barrier to achieving Art 19 in policy and practice. It is true 
that care homes and other sites of congregated living might be a more expensive 
option. Many group homes, for example, are expensive in both the short and long-
term.104  
 
On the other hand, there will be instances in which congregate care options are 
‘cheaper’, at least in financial terms, even as human costs may be great. 
 
The Committee acknowledge financial cost and the implementation challenges but 
argue that ‘the level of support required’ may not be invoked to deny the right to 
independent living and community participation.105 This will be particularly challenging 
for States Parties and civil society actors wishing to keep services from ‘reading down’ 
their obligations under Art 19, and it will be important to shine a light on any sectoral 
interests that may run contrary to Art 19 (for example, private group home providers 
and some public sector unions that seek to retain institutional environments).  
 
(e) Low and Middle-Income Countries 
 
The General Comment has a strong focus on middle and high-income jurisdictions in 
Europe, and the broader ‘Anglosphere’.106 Deinstitutionalisation emerges as a major 
concern of the General Comment, and understandably so. Yet, there may well be more 
parts of the world in which institutionalisation has not been, at least historically, the 
major barrier to independence and community participation; for example, in many parts 
of Asia, Africa107 and the Pacific.  
102 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [38],[43],[62]. 
103 See –– Davey v Oxfordshire County Council (The Equality & Human Rights Commission and Inclusion 
London intervening) [2017] EWCA Civ 1308, 1 September 2017. 
104 E.g. – C Purcal et al. Supported Accommodation Evaluation Framework Summary Report (SPRC Report 
31/2014) for the NSW Department of Family & Community Services, Ageing Disability and Home Care 
(Sydney: Social Policy Research Centre, UNSW Australia, 2014), [37]. 
105 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [20]. 
106 This point was made quite strongly in a webinar by Inclusion International on preparing a response to 
the draft General Comment. See –– Inclusion International, ‘Video: Preparing Feedback to the CRPD 
Committee on the Draft General Comment on Article 19’ <http://inclusion-international.org/video-
preparing-feedback-to-the-crpd-committee-on-the-draft-general-comment-on-article-19/> (accessed 
26/03/18). 
107 Elizabeth Kamundia has elaborated on this point with regards to Africa, and a specific focus on Kenya. 
See –– E Kamundia, ‘Choice, Support and Inclusion: Implementing Article 19 of the Convention on the 
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There are clear exceptions to the above generalisation, as the Users and Survivors of 
Psychiatry Kenya and the Japan National Assembly of Disabled Peoples’ International 
point out in their submissions to the Committee.108 Notably, these are two submissions 
among only four from Asia and Africa, the other two coming from the Government of 
Mongolia and the India-based organisation, Transforming Communities for Inclusion-
Asia (TCI-Asia).109 TCI-Asia report a troubling development in the recent growth of 
institutions in Asia, noting that: 
[e]ven though mental health legislations do not exist in many [Asian] countries, and some have 
[only] recently adopted new coercive mental health laws, mental institutions are coming up quite 
fast, resulting in the escalation of barriers to inclusion.110  
Bhargavi Davar (who leads TCI-Asia) has argued elsewhere that CRPD and legal 
capacity debates are often presented by Anglosphere commentators in universal 
terms.111 The General Comment may leave the Committee open to a similar charge.  
 
The Committee does state that: 
Article 19 reflects the diversity of cultural approaches to human living and ensures that its content 
is not biased towards certain cultural norms and values.112   
Perhaps this point could have been elaborated upon, and may be a fruitful area for 
future research. Davar again has argued that non-Western, low and middle income 
countries tend to be more concerned with developing inclusive and community-based 
support,113 rather than curtailing coercive state-based interventions.114 Advocates in 
these countries may be more concerned with family-led or localised forms of 
segregation, such as ‘Pasung’ in Indonesia,115 more so than state-based incursions. 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Kenya’ in African Yearbook on Disability Rights (Pretoria Law Press, 
2013) 
    <http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/adry/adry_volume1_2013.pdf>. 
108 Users and Survivors of Psychiatry – Kenya, ‘Day of General Discussion on Article 19 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2017), paras (5-7). <http://www.ohchr.org> (accessed 6 
February 2018); Japan National Assembly of Disabled Peoples’ International, ‘Submission to the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the Day of General Discussion on Article 19, 
CRPD’ (2017), (para) 1. <http://www.ohchr.org> (accessed 6 February 2018). 
109 Transforming Communities for Inclusion – Asia, ‘Submission to the UNCRPD Monitoring Committee, Day 
of General Discussion, Article 19’ <http://www.ohchr.org> (accessed 6 February 2018). 
110 Ibid. 
111 B Davar, ‘Legal Capacity and Civil Political Rights for People with Psychosocial Disabilities’ in A Hans 
(ed), Disability, Gender and the Trajectories of Power (Sage, 2015) [ch 11]. 
112 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [8]. 
113 Davar, above n 111. 
114 Ibid. See e.g. – Transforming communities for Inclusion, Asia, Summary Report on Transforming 
Communities for Inclusion - Asia: Working Towards TCI - Asia Strategy Development (Asia-Pacific 
Development Centre on Disability, June 2015)  
    <www.apcdfoundation.org/?q=system/files/TCI%20Asia%20Report_Readable%20PDF.pdf> (accessed 
5 May 2016). 
115 ‘Pasung’ refers to the chaining and caging of individuals with psychosocial disability. See; H Minas and 
H Diatri, ‘Pasung: Physical Restraint and Confinement of the Mentally Ill in the Community’ (2008) 2 
International Journal of Mental Health Systems [8]. 
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Consider Davar’s comment on recent debates in India around mental health law reform 
and institutionalisation: 
[e]ven these intense debates… are relevant only to the middle and upper classes in urban areas, 
especially non-resident Indians looking for the ideal mental institutions for ageing parents, sisters 
or other siblings and dependents. This may constitute around 7% of the Indian population. For 
the remaining 93% population in rural areas, inner city slums, mountainous terrains, and other 
far-flung regions of the country, where the social fabric is still intact, and where there is no doctor 
or asylum, this will have no relevance.116 
Elizabeth Kamundia has written from the African context about persons with disabilities 
typically living with their families against a cultural backdrop of largely communal ways 
of life without individualised state-funded support services.117 Approaches to securing 
the right to independent living and participation in the community in these contexts will 
differ enormously along social, cultural, economic and political lines. 
 
Problem-solving and sharing of solutions between disabled people’s organisations 
between and within low and middle income countries has been taking place for many 
decades, and show no sign of slowing down. There is scope to foster further 
collaboration. Some well-known research suggests low income countries tend to enjoy 
better long-term outcomes for people with severe mental health issues precisely 
because of higher levels of collectivism and social cohesion.118 This exceptionalism may 
even apply to socio-economically marginalised groups within high income countries. 
Among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with disabilities in Australia, for 
example, some data indicates their participation in cultural activities in their own 
communities is on par with other Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (which is 
quite unlike non-Indigenous people with disabilities).119  
 
Such solutions and positive trends are relevant to all countries, and their cross-
fertilisation surely warrants further research and support. Researchers could also 
consider how countries without mental health legislation are faring, and how CRPD-
based development in those jurisdictions might occur. The World Health Organisation 
‘QualityRights Framework’ may be useful for addressing these intersections,120 as are 
116  B Davar, ‘Legal Frameworks for and against People with Psychosocial Disabilities’ (2012) 47(52) 
Economic and Political Weekly [123]. 
117 Kamundia, above n 107. 
118 M Savill, C Banks, H Khanom, and S Priebe, ‘Do Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia Change over Time? 
A Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Data’ (2015) 45(8) Psychological Medicine [1613]. See also –   
Transforming communities for Inclusion, above n 114. 
119 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Social and Economic Wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people with disability. National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey 2014-2015. (Feature 
article) Rel. 4714.0 (2017); S Avery, ‘Disability in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities: The 
numbers and the narratives’ Presentation at the NHMRC-Lowitja Institute Knowledge Translation 
Conference, Brisbane, Australia (2017). 
120 See –– World Health Organisation, ‘WHO QualityRights initiative - improving quality, promoting human 
rights‘–website<http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/quality_rights/en/>(accessed 27/02/2018). 
Bernadette McSherry and Yvette Maker have considered the benefits and challenges for mental health 
practitioners of integrating a human rights perspective into mental health treatment and care. B 
McSherry and Y Maker, ‘International Human Rights and Mental Health: Challenges for law and practice. 
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the existing regional collaborations between communities in low- and middle-income 
countries.  
 
(f) Privatisation and Marketisation  
 
To some extent, the Committee brings attention to the increasing privatisation and 
marketisation of disability and other social services in some countries. The final draft 
of the General Comment included increased emphasis on ‘ensur[ing] that no rights 
enshrined in article 19 are violated’ by ‘private entities’ in addition to the state – a point 
that did not appear in the Draft.121 However, the scale of social policy change generated 
by marketisation and privatisation of health and social services in recent decades, 
particularly in high and middle income countries, may have warranted further attention. 
Marketisation is linked to efforts to personalise disability supports.122 My point is not to 
query the intrinsic value of ‘personalisation’ (which involves complex and often context-
specific questions about service delivery that have been well-investigated by others)123 
but rather to point out that marketisation and personalisation contain potential 
downsides, such as detracting from social justice agendas and meaningful choices for 
citizens.124 These pitfalls warrant attention by States Parties, civil society organisations 
and others who are enthusiastically embracing policies of personalisation, often in the 
name of rights. The General Comment will likely contribute to such enthusiasm, though 
perhaps without the caution, which (at least I would argue) is required.  
 
The previously noted report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, provides useful insights in on matters of privatised and market-driven 
services.125 In many countries, Art 19 will require effective regulation of market-driven 
systems aimed at improving choice and control for people with intellectual, cognitive 
and psychosocial disabilities, and ensuring sufficient feedback loops to guarantee social 




This review could not cover all issues warranting attention. The Committee does not 
specifically mention the experience of people with autism, for example. However, the 
Committee does not focus over-much on any one disability type (the term ‘mental 
health’, for example, only appears once, and ‘psychosocial’ three times). Yet, the 
absence of specific consideration of autism is noteworthy, including among the 
submissions.  
121 CRPD Committee, above n 6, [40]. See also – paras (51) and (97(j)). 
122 See –– A Roulstone and H Morgan, ‘Neo-liberal Individualism or Self-directed Support: Are We All 
Speaking the Same Language on Modernising Adult Social Care?’ (2009) 8(3) Social Policy and Society 
[333]. 
123 Ibid. See also – K Rummery, ‘A comparative analysis of personalisation: balancing an ethic of care with 
user empowerment’ (2011) 5(2) Ethics and Social Welfare 138; J Owens, T Mladenov and A Cribb, ‘What 
Justice, What Autonomy? The Ethical Constraints upon Personalisation’ (2017) 11(1) Ethics & Social 
Welfare [3]. 
124 Owens, Mladenov and Cribb, above n 123. 
125 Human Rights Council, above n 63, [60-62]. 
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Another concern, only touched upon here, is the expansion in some countries of parens 
patriae and police powers beyond mental health law into other policy areas, including 
drug and alcohol services (for example, forced drug and alcohol ‘rehabilitation’) and 
homelessness (for example, services using civil commitment laws to detain homeless 
people who refuse shelter).126  
 
Finally, ‘special defences’ in criminal law such as unfit to plead rules and the insanity 
defence are clearly relevant. People subject to such rules are often detained indefinitely. 
In many cases, increased community-based support will offer alternatives to custodial 
detention (notwithstanding the major legal challenge of the CRPD to this area of 
criminal law).127  
 
A key next step for those wishing to animate Art 19 is the deliberative development of 
basic guarantees, a satisfactory floor of social protection, harm minimisation strategies 
that respect non-interference, and the prioritising of structural changes required to 
achieve the transformative equality promoted by the CRPD.128 Overall, the General 
Comment brings together both the views of the Committee and a wide range of 
submission respondents, providing a welcome concentration of global knowledge on 
this most sui generis of CRPD rights. The material highlights points of overlapping 
consensus among diverse commentators and clear goals for concerted legal change 
and political action. 
 
126 E.g. – K Holland, ‘Services ‘sectioning’ homeless people who refuse shelter’ Irish Times (3 March 2018). 
 127 E.g. – A Arstein-Kerslake, P Gooding, L Andrews, B McSherry, ‘Human Rights and Unfitness to Plead: 
The Demands of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2017) 17(3) Human Rights 
Law Review [399]; T Minkowitz, ‘Rethinking Criminal Responsibility from a Critical Disability Perspective: 
The Abolition of Insanity/Incapacity Acquittals and Unfitness to Plead, and Beyond’ (2014) 23 Griffith 
Law Review [434]. 
 128 See –– T Minkowitz, ‘CRPD and Transformative Equality’ (2017) 13(1) International Journal of Law in 
Context [77]; T Degener, ‘Disability in a Human Rights Context’ (2016) 5(3) Laws [35]. 
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